Introduction Host countries often associate in‡ows of foreign direct investment (fdi) with a wide variety of bene…ts, the most common of which are transfers of modern technologies and more competitive product markets. Perhaps surprisingly, restrictions on fdi are also fairly common. The most frequently observed policy restrictions are those on the number of foreign …rms and on the extent of foreign ownership allowed. The pattern of these restrictions di¤ers across countries and often across sectors within countries. For instance, consider policy in basic telecommunications services. At one end, in the Philippines, a high degree of competition co-exists with limitations on foreign equity partnership. Bangladesh and Hong Kong are examples of countries that have no limitations on foreign ownership, but both have monopolies in the international telephony and oligopolies in other segments of the market. Pakistan and Sri Lanka have allowed limited foreign equity participation in monopolies to strategic investors, and deferred the introduction of competition for several years. Korea, however, is allowing increased foreign equity participation more gradually than competition. The objective of this paper is to shed light on the economic rationale behind these restrictions.1 The paper develops a simple model of fdi, where a foreign …rmcan choose between two modes of entry: direct entry wherein the foreign …rm establishes a wholly-owned subsidiary that competes with domestic …rms, and acquisition of an existing domestic …rm (we also allow for partial acquisition). In our model, the foreign …rm’s mode of entry a¤ects both the extent of technology transfer and the degree of competition in the host country. Divergence between the foreign …rm’s choice and the welfare interest of the domestic economy can create the basis for policy intervention.
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Laborator: Transferul de tehnologii. carte. Obiect: Comert International